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COMMENT
THE ELUSIVE APPEARANCE OF PROPRIETY:
JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION UNDER SECTION 455
Emerging in the last decade, numerous scandals' involving the federaljudiciary brought to the fore the need for major revisions in the 1924
Canons of Judicial Ethics' and in the federal statute which dealt with
judicial disqualification.3 The House of Delegates of the American Bar
Association took the first step in 1972 with its adoption of a new Code
of Judicial Conduct4 which advocated "the appearance of justice" as the
standard for judicial disqualification. However, when the Judicial Con-
ference of the United States,' the quasi-governing body of the federal
1. See Life, May 9, 1969 at 32, discussing how in 1966 Justice Fortas had accepted, but
later returned, a $20,000 fee from financier Louis Wolfson, who had been convicted of
illegal stock dealing. See also J. P. MACKENZIE, THE APPEARANCE OF JUSTICE 73 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as THE APPEARANCE OF JUSTICE]. President Nixon then nominated
Clement Haynsworth to replace Fortas, but after Congress discovered Haynsworth's fail-
ure to recuse himself in two cases in which he had indirect financial involvements, his
nomination was blocked. See Brunswick Corp. v. Long, 392 F.2d 337 (4th Cir. 1968) and
Darlington Mfg. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 325 F.2d 682 (4th Cir. 1963), rev'd sub nom. Textile
Workers v. Darlington Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965). See also THE APPEARANCE OF JUSTICE,
supra, at xi, and Hearings on the Nomination of Harry A. Blackmun Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 49-50 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Black-
mun Hearings], both showing that Blackmun was qualified for the Supreme Court only
after it was determined at the hearing that he had long understood better than most of
his fellow judges the need for the strictest ethical code. Justice Blackmun told Senator
Bayh that he interpreted the "substantial interest" clause of 28 U.S.C. §455 (1970) to
mean the appearance of any bias. When he first became a judge, Blackmun had encoun-
tered an "interest" problem and had brought to the attention of the chief judge his trivial
interests in a litigant before him. The chief judge determined that Blackmun should sit.
See also discussion accompanying notes 18-26 infra, describing Justice Rehnquist's con-
duct in Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
2. The need for revision is noted in E. W. THODE, REPORTER'S NOTES TO THE CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT 43 (1973) [hereinafter cited as REPORTER'S NOTES]. See also R. A.
Ainsworth, Jr., Judicial Ethics-A Crisis of Confidence, 42 OHIO B.A.R. 1111 (1969), where
Judge Ainsworth indicates that the ABA revision of the Code of Judicial Ethics was also
a public relations gesture.
3. 28 U.S.C. §455 (1970).
4. ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1972) [hereinafter cited as ABA CODE]. See
REPORTER'S NOTES, supra note 2, at 42.
5. In 1922, Congress, by virtue of 28 U.S.C. §331 (1970), created the Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States, which is composed of the chief judge of each circuit, the chiefjudge of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, and a district judge from each circuit.
In 1939 Congress decided that this conference was ineffective and amended the statute to
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judiciary, applied this new Code of Judicial Conduct to all federal
judges, it "specifically provided that its action [in adopting the new
Code] did not abrogate or modify . . . conflicting provisions of
[Federal] Statutes 'which [were] considered to be less restrictive than
the provisions of the ABA Code.' "'
FEDERAL STATUTES PRIOR TO THE NEW SECTION 455
At the time the Judicial Conference adopted the ABA Code, there
were three federal statutes dealing with the subject of judicial disqualifi-
cation. None of these three statutes emphasized or implied that the
"appearance of justice" was the important criterion in a judge's decision
to disqualify himself. One statute merely prevented an appellate judge
from reviewing a case he had tried as a district court judge.7 Another
provision,' applicable only to federal district court judges, appeared to
make judicial disqualification mandatory when a litigant filed a timely
affidavit alleging his belief' that the judge had a "personal bias or
prejudice either against him or in favor of the adverse party."' 0
A third provision," section 455, applied to all federal judges and enu-
require the conference to meet and discuss administrative and judicial matters once a
year. For a short history of the conference, see W.E. Burger, The Courts on Trial, 22
F.R.D. 71 (1968). But see THE APPEARANCE OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 135, and 62 CONG.
REC. 201-02 (1922) where the Judicial Conference has been referred to as the "judges'
lobby."
6. S. REP. No. 93-419, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1973) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No.
93-419].
7. 28 U.S.C. § 47 (1970).
8. Id. §144.
9. Under 28 U.S.C. §144 (1970), the party requesting recusal must allege facts that
reveal a bias in the judge of an extrajudicial origin. See United States v. Grinnell Corp.,
384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966); United States v. Bolden, 355 F.2d 453, 456 (7th Cir. 1965); Lyons
v. United States, 325 F.2d 370, 376 (9th Cir. 1963). Only one circuit thus far has indicated
that the litigant's belief in the judge's bias is sufficient for recusal. See Parris v. Board of
Comm'rs, 505 F.2d 12, 20 (5th Cir. 1974), Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921),
which held that although a judge must accept the facts enunciated in the affidavit as true,
he alone determines the factual sufficiency of the affidavit. See also United States v.
Townsend, 478 F.2d 1072 (3d Cir. 1973); Wolfson v. Palmieri, 396 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1968);
United States v. Fricke, 261 F. 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1919); United States v. Buck, 18 F. Supp.
827 (W.D. Mo. 1937). Cf. Halliday v. United States, 389 F.2d 270 (lst Cir. 1967), rehearing
denied, 395 U.S. 971 (1968).
10. 28 U.S.C. §144 (1970).
11. Id. §455:
Any justice or judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any case
in which he has a substantial interest, has been of counsel, is or has been a
material witness, or is so related to or connected with any party or his attorney
as to render it improper, in his opinion, for him to sit on the trial, appeal, or
other proceeding therein.
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merated four situations in which judges should disqualify themselves.
While it was easy to apply this statute in situations in which the judge
had actually represented one of the parties,'2 or had been a material
witness'3 in the case before him, it was more difficult to determine the
meaning of "substantial interest,"'" of "improper" conduct,'" and of
disqualifying relationships.' 6 Besides lacking detailed and well-defined
standards, section 455 failed "to provide a central underlying rationale
for disqualification which could help a judge decide whether to disqual-
ify himself in instances not expressly covered by its mandatory provi-
sions."' 7
The absence of a "central rationale" in all the federal judicial disqual-
ification statutes was emphasized by Justice Rehnquist's decision to
participate in Laird v. Tatum.'" Mr. Justice Rehnquist justified his
12. See United States v. Vasilick, 160 F.2d 631 (3d Cir. 1947), where the judge could
not properly act on defendant's motion to vacate judgment because he had been the
prosecuting district attorney in the same case. See also Carr v. Fife, 156 U.S. 494 (1895);
Rose v. United States, 295 F. 687 (4th Cir. 1924). In most cases, the phrase "of counsel"
has been interpreted literally, and the judge has been disqualified only when he had
actually represented the same parties who were presenting identical issues now before
him. See also Firhaber v. Sensenbrenner, 385 F. Supp. 406, 411 (E.D.Wis. 1974).
13. To be a material witness a judge must actually be called by one of the parties. See
Borgia v. United States, 78 F.2d 550, 554-55 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 615 (1935).
14. Judge Haynsworth, for example, did not think his indirect stock interest in the
companies litigating before him represented substantial interest in Brunswick Corp. v.
Long, 392 F.2d 337 (4th Cir. 1968) or in Darlington Mfg. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 325 F.2d 682
(4th Cir. 1963). See Hearings on the Nomination of Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr. Before
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 43, 99, 275-77 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Haynsworth Nomination Hearings]. See also G. Edwards, Commentary on Judi-
cial Ethics, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 259, 264-67 (1969), where Judge Edwards states that a
substantial interest should be defined not only in terms of the judge's percentage of the
outstanding shares in a company but also in relation to the judge's entire portfolio
[hereinafter cited as Commentary on Judicial Ethics].
15, Although 28 U.S.C. §455 (1970) did mention "impropriety" it "made no attempt
to define what is 'improper', and the experience of [the] federal judges who [had]
disqualified themselves provide[d] little experience in this regard because federal judges
rarely stated their reasons for disqualification." Note, Disqualification of Judges and
Justices in the Federal Courts, 86 HARV. L. REV. 736, 741 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Federal Disqualification].
16. The judge's confusion in determining which blood relationships and associations
were disqualifying are noted in Hearings on S. 1064 Before the Subcomm. on Improve-
ments in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(July 1971 - May 1973) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings on S. 1064].
17. Federal Disqualification, supra note 15, at 742.
18. 408 U.S. 1 (1972). In this five-four decision (in which Rehnquist voted with the
majority), the Supreme Court found non-justiciable the respondents' claim that army
surveillance of their civilian political activity chilled their first amendment rights. A four-
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participation in that decision on the grounds that his testimony about
the case before a congressional subcommittee, prior to his ascension to
the Supreme Court, was merely a statement of the applicable law, and
not a decision on the merits. 9 Consequently, he felt his conduct was not
prohibited by section 455.10 Justice Rehnquist also felt that he could not
be considered to have been "of counsel," since he had not actively par-
ticipated, advised or pleaded the Government's case;2 mere association
with the Justice Department did not make him privy to the case. Sec-
tion 455 left the decision of disqualification solely to the judge to be
disqualified, 2 and Justice Rehnquist felt that he was qualified.
Because of the absence of a provision for the substitution of Supreme
Court Justices,2 Justice Rehnquist felt that he had a "duty-to-sit" if
qualified or not sufficiently disqualified.2 4 However, he did not apply
prior Supreme Court cases which had tempered this duty-to-sit with the
duty of maintaining the "appearance of justice." 5 Since Rehnquist did
four decision would have instead produced an affirmance of the court of appeals' finding
of justiciability.
19. Rehnquist, J., Memorandum on Motion to Recuse, 409 U.S. 824, 834-35 (1972).
20. 28 U.S.C. §455 (1970). Rehnquist, J., Memorandum on Motion to Recuse, 409 U.S.
at 828.
21. Rehnquist, J., Memorandum on Motion to Recuse, 409 U.S. at 833.
22. The Supreme Court as a matter of policy leaves the question of disqualification to
the individual Justice involved and this decision is not reviewable. However, the decision
of a lower court judge can be reviewed and reversed on appeal. See U.S. Fidelity &
Guaranty Co. v. Lawrenson, 334 F.2d 464 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 379 U.S. 869 (1964);
N.L.R.B. v. Guernsey-Muskingun Electric Co-operative, 285 F.2d 8 (6th Cir. 1960);
Nichols-Morris, Inc. v. Morris, 272 F.2d 586 (2d Cir. 1959). Abuse of discretion is grounds
for review. See 28 U.S.C. §2106 (1959).
23. However, there is a way to "substitute" all of the Justices on the Supreme Court.
This method was put to use by the Justices in United States v. Aluminum Co., 320 U.S.
708 (1943). There the Supreme Court delayed disposition of the case because four Jus-
tices were disqualified and hence the Court did not have the six-justice quorum neces-
sary for decision. Because of this problem, 15 U.S.C. §29 was amended in 1944 to provide
for certification of the case to the court of appeals when there is no quorum of Supreme
Court Justices qualified to participate in consideration of the case. See 15 U.S.C. §29
(1970). Consequently, this case was transferred for certification to the Court of Appeals
of the Second Circuit at 322 U.S. 716 (1943) to 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
24. In his Memorandum on Motion to Recuse, 409 U.S. 824, 837 (1972), Justice Rehn-
quist relied upon the following cases for the rule that a judge has a "duty-to-sit" where
he is not disqualified: Wolfson v. Palmieri, 396 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v.
Hoffa, 382 F.2d 856 (6th Cir. 1967); Tynan v. United States, 376 F.2d 761 (D.C. Cir. 1967);
Edwards v. United States, 334 F.2d 360 (5th Cir. 1964); Simmons v. United States, 302
F.2d 71 (3d Cir. 1962); In re Union Leader Corp., 292 F.2d 381 (1st Cir. 1961).
25. "[Jlustice must satisfy the appearance of justice." Commonwealth Coatings Corp.
v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 148 (1968); Offut v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14
(1954); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 135 (1955).
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not consider the "appearance of justice" standard nor the newly adopted
ABA Code, many commentators" felt that Justice Rehnquist had fol-
lowed only the bare letter and not the spirit of section 455.
In light of the public27 and judicial28 disapproval of Justice Rehn-
quist's conduct in Laird v. Tatum, Congress began work on an amend-
ment to section 455 "to rescue judges from the horns of the dilemma
they currently face . . ." and to reconcile the new Code of Judicial
Conduct with the less stringent federal disqualification statutes. 9 First
introduced in May 1973,10 Senate Bill 1064" was designed to amend
section 455 so as to conform to the canons of the ABA Code of Judicial
Conduct.2 The statute was specifically designed to eradicate the "dual
standards, statutory and ethical, couched in uncertain language, that
had the effect of forcing a judge to decide either the legal or ethical issue
at his peril." 3
THE NEW SECTION 455
A. The General Standard
Based on the new Code of Judicial Conduct,34 the amended section
45535 is a substantial modification of the old statute. Unlike the prior
section 455, the new statute specifically applies to magistrates, adminis-
trative judges and referees in bankruptcy as well as to judges and jus-
tices.36 More importantly, the new statute also contains the general or
26. THE APPEARANCE OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 211-13. See also Note, Justice Rehn-
quist's Decision to Participate in Laird v. Tatum, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 106 (1973); Com-
ment, Disqualification for Interest of Lower Federal Court Judges: 28 U.S. C. § 455, 71
MICH. L. REV. 538 (1973).
27. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1972, at 1, col. 4.
28. Senate Hearings on S. 1064, supra note 16, at 89. (Statements of Justice Roger
Traynor and William Westphal, Chief Counsel for the Committee).
29. Id. at 74. (Statement of Senator Burdick).
30. Id. at 73.
31. S. 1064, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
32. ABA CODE, supra note 4. Senate Hearings on S. 1064, supra note 16, at 74.
33. H.R. REP. No. 93-1453, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1973) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP.
No. 93-1453]. Because the new statute incorporates much of the literal language of the
Code, the Code will be mentioned specifically only in those sections where it and the
statute differ substantially.
34. ABA CODE, supra note 4. Senate Hearings on S. 1064, supra note 16, at 74. Because
the statute is based upon the Code, the Reporter's Notes will be used to clarify those
sections of the statute that Congress did not explicate.
35. 28 U.S.C.A. §455 (Supp. Feb. 1975). See Appendix I, infra, for text of §455. The
bill to amend 28 U.S.C. §455 (1970) was enacted on December 5, 1974, and applies to any
review submitted after that date as well as to proceedings commenced after that date.
36. 28 U.S.C.A. §455(a) (Supp. Feb. 1975). See 63 F.R.D. 319, 338 (1973) which made
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"catch-all" provision that a judge "shall disqualify himself in any pro-
ceeding in which his impartiality might be reasonably questioned.""
This general standard is a great improvement over the old section 455,
which provided no central rationale at all. Instead of permitting the
judge's decision to disqualify himself to remain entirely subjective, the
amended law introduces the objective standard of the "reasonable man"
into the question of disqualification. In other words, although a judge
may not be in fact biased, "any conduct that would lead a reasonable
man knowing all the circumstances to the conclusion that the judge's
'impartiality might reasonably be questioned' "8 would disqualify the
judge.
The new standard is supposed to remove the so-called "duty-to-sit"39
when the relationships or the knowledge of the judge does not fall under
one of the new statute's enumerated standards." Yet, the removal of this
"duty-to-sit" does not allow the judge to avoid deciding difficult or
controversial issues;4' he is still obligated to sit if a reasonable man
cannot charge him with lack of impartiality. Thus, a limited duty to sit
remains under the new section 455.
B. Disqualification for Relationship, Knowledge and Former
Employment
Subsections (b)(1), (2) and (3) of the amended statute provide for the
disqualification of the judge in certain specific situations. Under subsec-
tion (b)(1), a judge must disqualify himself "where he has a personal
bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed
evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding."42 The disqualifying bias or
prejudice can be either for or against a party, can develop from prior
personal relationships, and can also arise from the nature of the conduct
of a party.43 Under this subsection, a judge should also be cognizant of
the fact that even innocent personal relationships create disqualification
the old section 455 applicable to administrative hearings.
37. 28 U.S.C.A. §455(d) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
38. Senate Hearings on S. 1064, supra note 16, at 114. See also REPORTER'S NOTES, supra
note 2, at 60.
39. H.R. REP. No. 93-1453, supra note 33. See cases note 24, supra.
40. H.R. REP. No, 93-1453, supra note 33.
41. Id.
42. This section of the statute duplicates Canon 3C(1)(a) of the ABA CODE, supra note
4.
43. See Senate Hearings on S. 1064, supra note 16, at 46. The new statute specifically
defines the relationships which had been left unclarified by the old section 455. See text
accompanying notes 66-129 infra.
1975]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
and bias problems."
The bias or prejudice of a judge does not have to stem merely from
relationships with people or conduct but may also originate in daily
experiences. 5 To the drafters of the statute, Justice Frankfurter exem-
plified the realization that prejudices can emanate from unvarying rou-
tines. Frankfurter disqualified himself in Public Utilities Commission v.
Pollak," a case which dealt with the constitutionality of the use of
loudspeakers to transmit music and advertisements on public transpor-
tation. As a passenger of such vehicles, Justice Frankfurter stated that
his "feelings [were] so engaged as a victim of the practice in contro-
versy" that he believed it better to decline participation in the case.
He felt that "[when] there is ground for believing that such uncon-
scious feelings may operate in the ultimate judgment, or may not un-
fairly lead others to believe they are operating, judges recuse them-
selves." 8
Clarifying the old statute's material witness provision, 9 subsection
(b)(3)5" indicates that a judge cannot be impartial if he has prior per-
sonal, not judicial, knowledge of the facts in dispute. Hopefully, a com-
bination of subsections (b)(1) and (3) can eliminate the problems Jus-
tice Rehnquist faced in Laird v. Tatum,5 where he was accused of pre-
judging the case as well as being a material witness in light of his
previous exposure to the case. Because the legislative history of the new
statute includes references to Rehnquist's behavior, perhaps "personal
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts" will now cncompass any prior
extra-judicial exposure to the facts of a case.
The drafters of the statute also stated that subsection (b)(3) would
not apply to a judge who had a "fixed belief" about the law applicable
to a given case,52 but they did note that it would apply to one who had
44. H.R. REP. No. 93-1453, supra note 33, at 3. But see Bumpus v. Uniroyal Tire Co.
Div. of Uniroyal Inc., 385 F. Supp. 711 (E.D.Pa. 1974) where the judge refused, under the
auspices of the old statute, to disqualify himself in a case in which one of the parties was
represented by an old friend and former partner.
45. See Senate Hearings on S. 1064, supra note 16, at 41-52 and 106-08. See also
REPORTER'S NOTES, supra note 2, at 63, which substantiates this congressional observation.
46. 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
47. Id. at 467.
48. Id. at 466-67.
49. 28 U.S.C. §455 (1970) did not define the term, "material witness."
50. Subsection (b)(3) of the new statute provides for a judge's disqualification. 28
U.S.C.A. §455 (Supp, Feb. 1975). See also Senate Hearings on S. 1064, supra note 16, at
114-15 and REPORTER'S NOTES, supra note 2, at 63.
51. 408 U.S. 1 (1972). See notes 18-29 and accompanying text supra.
52. While subsection (b)(3) would not exclude, as a ground for disqualification, a
judge's pre-established theory of the first amendment, it could affect a judge who had been
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extra-judicial exposure to the facts of the case. 3 The drafters failed,
however, to explain how a judge's fixed belief about the applicable law
is any less pernicious to a litigant than a judge's prior exposure to the
facts of a case. In one instance, the judge might apply the law only in a
specific manner; in the other, he might emphasize certain facts over
others. In either situation, the litigant would not be able to face, as he
ought, an impartial judge.54 Thus, while this subsection reaches biases
left untouched by the old statute,5 it still does not reach the "possible
bias or prejudice of an issue ... ""
The drafters recognized the vagueness of the unamended section 455's
phrase "of counsel"57 and, consequently, attempted to make that phrase
more explicit in subsections (b)(2) and (3).11 Many federal judges are
an attorney with the Justice Department. Presumably, this section, for example, would
not have prevent Justice Douglas, whose views regarding the first amendment were well-
known, from judging a case about pornography but would have prevented Justice Rehn-
quist from ruling in Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
53. Senate Hearings on S. 1064, supra note 16, at 100.
54. S. REP. No. 93-419, supra note 6.
55. Under the new statute, perhaps no judge will seriously attempt to preside over a
case in which a litigant's attorney is also representing the judge in another matter, as
occurred in Texaco, Inc. v. Chandler, 354 F. 2d 655 (10th Cir. 1965). Also, the new statute
might prevent a judge from ruling in a case in which he has previously indicated his dislike
or admiration of a particular group, as was the case in Berger v. United States, 255 U.S.
22 (1921). There, prior to the trial of some Americans of German descent for sabotage,
the trial judge professed to have an overwhelming dislike of Germans. The Supreme Court
agreed with the petitioners that the bias of Judge Landis did deny them a fair trial.
Similarly, the new statute might protect litigants in a civil rights suit from more subtle
manifestations of bias. Haynsworth, for example, was criticized for deciding civil rights
cases when he belonged to a segregated country club. See Haynsworth Nomination Hear-
ings, supra note 14, at 586-87.
56. Senate Hearings on S. 1064, supra note 16, at 114. An example of issue bias appears
in Pennsylvania v. Local 542, IOUE, 388 F. Supp. 155 (E.D. Pa. 1974), a case which was
decided under the old statute. There, the defendant union claimed that the judge's back-
ground as a black scholar and advocate of civil rights gave him a bias as to the issues in a
civil rights case. Judge Higginbotham claimed that his removal from the case could lead
to the argument that "black judges should per se be disqualified from hearing cases which
involve racial issues;" he also cited specific instances in which judges had ruled in cases
in which they had a similar kind of interest. Id. at 165. However, while Judge Higgin-
botham's historical analysis is accurate and his reasons for remaining on the case are
valid, he did fail to deal directly with the notion of issue bias and to note the criticism
that Haynsworth had received for similar kinds of rulings.
57. See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1970). General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Watkins, 363 F. 2d 87
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U. S. 899 (1966), highlights the problem of the phrase "of
counsel."
58. 28 U.S.C.A. §455 (b)(2), (3) (Supp. Feb. 1975). See Appendix I, infra; compare
Canon 3C(1)(b) of the ABA CODE, supra note 4, which provides:
he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom he
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appointed to the bench from prior governmental service, and therefore,
former governmental employment affects the federal judiciary more
than its state counterparts. 9 Therefore, these subsections specifically
apply to judges who were recruited from the public sector as well as
those selected from the private sector."0
The new federal statute does not tie the judge's previous legal employ-
ment to the "appearance of impartiality" standard." Instead, the stat-
ute equates the judge's prior governmental service with being a material
witness, advisor, or counselor or with expressing an "opinion concerning
the merits of the particular case in controversy." 62 While isolating from
the bench such prior official behavior as Rehnquist's discussion of Laird
v. Tatum at a Senate hearing, 3 this definition seems to maintain the
old statute's definition of "of counsel" as enunciated by Rehnquist 4 and
prior case law: one is "of counsel" if he researches, pleads or assists in
the preparation of a case. 5
C. Disqualification for Family and Financial Interests
The pre-1947 federal judicial disqualification statute6 used the term
previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning
the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness concerning
it;
While this Canon was intended to be broad enought to apply to those judges who came
to the bench from private practice and government posts, its discussion of lawyers, their
relationships to each other and to judges and clients, was too broad to apply to all federal
judges. The Code merely notes that: "[a] lawyer in a governmental agency does not
necessarily have an association with other lawyers employed by that agency within the
meaning of this subsection; a judge formerly employed by a governmental agency, how-
ever, should disqualify himself in a proceeding if his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned because of such association." REPORTER'S NOTES supra note 2, at 15.
59. Senate Hearings on S. 1064, supra note 16, at 15.
60. Id. at 114. The drafters specifically noted Justice Rehnquist's decision in Laird in
their delineation of the public and private sectors.
61. Id. at 74-75. In this way the new statute differs from the Code. REPORTER'S NOTES,
supra note 2, at 15.
62. 28 U.S.C.A. §455(b)(3) (Supp. Feb. 1975). See Appendix I, infra.
63. Senate Hearings on S. 1064, supra note 16, at 74-75.
64. Rehnquist, J. Memorandum on Motion to Recuse, 409 U. S. at 826-28.
65. See, e.g., General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Watkins, 363 F. 2d 87 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U. S. 899 (1966). See also In re Grand Jury Investigation, 486 F. 2d 1013 (3d
Cir. 1973); United States v. Wilson, 426 F. 2d 268 (6th Cir. 1970).
66. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, §455, 62 Stat. 908. See Frank, Disqualification of
Judges, 56 YALE L. J. 605 (1947). At one point in his article, which traces the history of
judicial disqualification, Mr. Frank notes that the then-current American practice was to
disqualify for any financial interest. Id. at 613. In a later article, Frank, Commentary on
Disqualification of Judges-Canon 3C, 1972 UTAH L. REV. 377,383-84 (1972) [hereinafter
[Vol. 25:104
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"interest" alone as the basis for judicial disqualification. The result was
that judges who had any interest, regardless of how insubstantial, re-
cused themselves."7 Under the old section 4555 the word "interest"
meant a substantial pecuniary interest. 9 As commentators'" and cases"
revealed, federal judges had a difficult time in determining just what
could be considered a substantial interest." Under this statute, the term
substantial was relative; one's concept of substantiality was governed by
what one owned. 3 Thus, what was substantial to one judge was trivial
to another. The unamended section 455 therefore provided only conflict-
ing definitions of substantiality and of interest."4
Subsections (b)(4), (b)(5) and (c) of the recently amended statute5
not only return to the pre-1947 unqualified "interest," but they go much
further toward creating a clear standard. Read in conjunction with the
definitions of subsection (d),11 the new statute leaves little room for
judicial doubt.
cited as Commentary on Disqualification], he points out that the word "substantial" did
not modify "interest" until 1948.
67. Commentary on Disqualification, supra note 66, at 383.
68. 28 U. S. C. §455 (1970).
69. In United States v. Bell, 351 F. 2d 868 (6th Cir. 1965) and Adams v. United States,
302 F. 2d 307 (5th Cir. 1962), substantial interest was generally equated with pecuniary
interest. See Long v. Stites, 63 F. 2d 855 (6th Cir. 1933), where substantial interest
included a judge's interest in a bank in which he and his wife were depositors, and
Lampert v. Hollis Music, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 3 (E.D.N.Y. 1952), where substantial interest
included a judge's insubstantial stock holding in the company-litigant before him. But
see Robertson v. United States, 249 F. 2d 737 (5th Cir. 1957), where the meaning of
substantial interest was also held to include prior knowledge of a case, an interest which
in the new statute falls under subsection (b)(1).
70. See generally Hearings on S. 1064 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties
and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 11 (1973). (Statement of John P. Frank) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings on S.
1064].
71. See note 69, supra.
72. Appearing before a senate committee to discuss proposed procedures to oversee
federal judges, Judge Ainsworth of the fifth circuit pointed out that "the guidelines are
not there . . . now. . . . 'Substantial interest' is not defined." Hearings on S. 1506 et.
al. Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 31 (1969 & 1970). [hereinafter cited as
Hearings on Judicial Machinery].
73. Commentary on Judicial Ethics, supra note 14.
74. See note 69, supra.
75. 28 U.S.C. §455 (Supp. Feb. 1975). See Appendix I, infra. These provisions duplicate
sections 3C(1)(c) and (d), and 3c(2) respectively, of the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct
(1972).
76. Definitions of terms including proceeding, relationship, fiduciary, and financial
interest, inter alia, are provided in 28 U.S.C.A. § 455(d). See Appendix I, infra. See also
Senate Hearings on S. 1064, supra note 16, at 32-52 (Statement of John P. Frank).
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Financial Interests-Subsection (b)(4)
The definition of financial interest is no longer left to conjecture and
relativism. Under subsection (d), financial interest "means ownership
of a legal or equitable interest, however small, or a relationship as direc-
tor, advisor, or other active participant in the affairs of a party. . .. "I'
Now a judge must disqualify himself when "he knows that he,
individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child residing in
his household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in contro-
versy or in a party to the proceeding. . .. "I Regardless of how impar-
tial the judge actually is, if any financial interest can be shown,
"whether the interest was that of the judge or one of specified family
members,"79 the judge must disqualify himself. Thus, subsection (b)(4)
incorporates the "appearance of impartiality" as the standard for dis-
qualification.
The new statute creates a distinction between the judge's direct and
indirect financial involvements. Although the Senate committee did not
want to prevent the judge from investing, it did want to prevent the
judge from investing in companies that could litigate before him. By
carefully avoiding certain investments, a judge could also avoid frequent
disqualification."0 But certain "indirect" interests still escape definition;
for example, whether the fact that a judge is a shareholder in a company
that does business with the corporation now before him represents a
disqualifying interest."' In addition, the statute makes no attempt to
define the kind of additional "participation in the affairs of a party"
that might also disqualify a judge; for example, whether additional
participation includes being a friend, an informal advisor or a boy scout
leader. The statute merely indicates that the "appearance of impro-
priety" remains the standard by which indirect interests are judged."
77. 28 U.S.C.A. §455(d) (Supp. Feb. 1975). See Appendix I, infra.
78. Id. §455(b)(4).
79. Senate Hearings on S. 1064, supra note 16, at 91-113. See also REPORTER'S NOTES,
supra note 2, at 63-67.
80. Senate Hearings on S. 1064, supra note 16, at 101. Many of the witnesses at this
hearing indicated that persistent disqualifications also discourage public esteem for the
judiciary. See also REPORTER'S NOTES, supra note 2, at 66. The old statute made no effort
to consider the problems of judicial investments, and consequently, a judge had a difficult
time in determining which of his interests mandated recusal.
81. Witness Haynsworth's problems at Haynsworth Nomination Hearings, supra note
14. Haynsworth faced this problem in Darlington Mfg. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 325 F.2d 682 (4th
Cir. 1963), rev'd, 380 U.S. 263 (1965), in which he owned stock in a company that did
business with one of the litigating parties.
82. Senate Hearings on S. 1064, supra note 16, at 99. See also REPORTER'S NOTES, supra
note 2 at 60-61.
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The drafters of the statute felt strongly that they should identify the
types of investment that would not automatically lead to a judge's dis-
qualification.13 Under the statute, not all monetary interests are consid-
ered disqualifying financial interests."4 For instance, a judge can own
shares in a mutual fund that invests in securities and still preside over
a case involving those securities unless he has participated in the man-
agement of the fund. 5 He can also invest in mutual insurance compa-
nies, mutual savings association and government securities so long as
the value of these investments will not be "substantially affected" by
the outcome of the proceeding before him.86 Under these provisions, the
key to judicial disqualification seems to be the degree of actual partici-
pation and financial involvement in the indirect investments. While the
statute does not specify what constitutes "to participate" in the
management" or to be "substantially affected" by the outcome, it does
indicate that evaluation of the judge's participation will be achieved
according to the terms of the general appearance of propriety standard.8
The statute draws a distinction between the judge's financial or fidu-
ciary interest as the director, advisor or manager8" in a corporation, bank
or business, and the judge's interest as an advisor or participant in the
affairs of a school, fraternity or other organization whose primary func-
tion is not financial." In the former situation, a judge is automatically
disqualified; in the latter he may not be unless his impartiality may be
83. Senate Hearings on S. 1064, supra note 16, at 105. See also REPORTER'S NOTES, supra
note 2, at 69, where the ABA committee noted that "a judge's interest as an office holder
in an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization is not a 'financial
interest' in securities held by the organization" and, consequently, does not disqualify the
judge on financial or fiduciary grounds.
84. This description of financial interest applies to the Code as well. See ABA CODE,
supra note 4, Canon 3C(1)(c) and (d).
85. 28 U.S.C.A. §455(d)(4)(i) (Supp. Feb. 1975). See Appendix I, infra.
86. Id., §§(d)(4)(iii), (iv). See Appendix I, infra.
87. THE APPEARANCE OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 47-58 mentions Justice Douglas' prob-
lems with respect to the Parvin Foundation, of which Douglas was a trustee. Douglas was
accused of giving legal advice to the Foundation as well as being involved with the Foun-
dation's curious financial dealings.
88. Senate Hearings on S. 1064, supra note 16, at 11-12. See also REPORTER'S NOTES,
supra note 2, at 60-61. The Code, however, makes the application of the general standard
to this situation more explicit than does the statute, which permits waiver of the general
standard. See discussion on waiver of judicial disqualification, notes 130-58 and accom-
panying text, infra.
89. 28 U.S.C.A. §455(d)(4) (Supp. Feb. 1975). See Appendix I, infra. The ABA CODE
supra note 4, Canon 3C(3)(c), draws the same distinctions.
90. See Senate Hearings on S. 1064, supra note 16, at 105-07. See also REPORTER'S
NOTES, supra note 2, at 69.
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reasonably questioned." Though this distinction is somewhat tenuous,
it nonetheless creates a more realistic demarcation between the judge's
genuine financial interest and his performance of a social service.
Subsection (b)(4) mandates recusal where the judge has "any other
interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the pro-
ceeding" before him."3 "This category has a broad sweep;" 4 it is in-
tended to include indirect financial interests, 5 as well as the judge's
interest as a ratepayer, taxpayer and consumer." However, in order to
prevent subconscious bias on the part of the judge, the rationale enun-
ciated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Public Utilities Commission v.
Pollak7 is much more comprehensive and should have been taken into
account by the drafters of the statute. Conceivably, this section would
also apply to situations in which a litigant before the judge was not a
previous law partner or associate but simply had prior business dealings
with the judge. 8
Although "[a] judge should disqualify himself if the outcome of the
proceedings could substantially affect his interests as a customer [or]
as a taxpayer," 9 this "substantially affected" test provides little guid-
ance for the judge. By using the vague term "substantial," the drafters
91. See Senate Hearings on S. 1064, supra note 16, at 11-12. See also REPORTER'S NOTES,
supra note 2, at 69.
92. In most cases, no distinction was made between social service and business inter-
ests. See authorities cited in note 69, supra. See also Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil
& Refining Co., 324 F. Supp. 1371 (S.D. Tex. 1969), aff'd, 441 F.2d 631 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971)., for the proposition that the term substantial interest is
primarily concerned with pecuniary and beneficial interests. But see Roberson v. United
States, 249 F.2d 737 (5th Cir. 1957).
93. 28 U.S.C.A. § 455(b)(4) (Supp. Feb. 1975) See Appendix I, infra ABA CODE, supra
note 4, Canon 3C(1)(C), is identical.
94. Senate Hearings on S. 1064, supra note 16, at 103.
95. Federal Disqualification, supra note 15, at 752-53.
96. Senate Hearings on S. 1064, supra note 16, at 103.
97. 343 U.S. 451, 466 (1952). See notes 46-48 and accompanying text supra.
98. See Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968),
where the Supreme Court disqualified an arbitrator for not disclosing to all the parties
his earlier business relationship with one of the parties. The Court stated that the issue
in the case was "whether elementary requirements of impartiality taken for granted in
every judicial proceedings are suspended when the parties agree to resolve a dispute
through arbitration." Id. at 145. Comparing §18 of the Rules of the American Arbitration
Association to § 33 of the (old) Canons of Judicial Ethics, the Court concluded that the
two guidelines required that both an arbitrator and a judge "avoid even the appearance
of bias." Id. at 150. Consequently, the Court voided the arbitrator's decision because his
non-disclosure of prior business dealings with one of the parties to the arbitration violated
the appearance of impartiality.
99. Senate Hearings on S. 1064, supra note 16, at 103.
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of the statute have made this interest inferior to the other indirect
financial interests that a judge may have. In doing so, the drafters have
inadvertently recreated the very problem they sought to eliminate,
namely the absence of a concrete meaning for the vague term "substan-
tial." Instead of using the "substantially affected" test, the drafters
could have defined interest in terms of an examination of circumstances
and relationships, a standard espoused by the Supreme Court in 1955.100
Such a standard would pierce the disqualifying aspects of an indirect
relationship or interest rather than merely indicate that a consideration
of the interest should be made.
Family Interests-Subsections (b)(5) and (c)
Under the prior statute, the judge could sit in a proceeding in which
a distant relative or friend was appearing as either a party litigant or
legal representative,"0 ' but he was required to disqualify himself when
one of the parties or legal representatives before him was within the
fourth degree of consanguinity.' °2 Case law, however, did not discuss the
problem of a judge ruling in a case in which one of the litigants was
connected to him in a less lineal way, as are, for example, in-laws and
a spouse's relatives. Because of this oversight, the Senate committee
considered the "near relative" standard too vague' °3 and felt that a
relative as a party was only part of the problem.' 4 Therefore, the draf-
ters of the statute expanded the disqualification standard.',5
The new family disqualification standard, subsection (b)(5),111 makes
100. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955). Murchison and others were called as wit-
nesses before a judge who was a then-lawful one man grand jury. The judge cited them
for contempt for not answering certain questions, and then tried and convicted them. The
Supreme Court voided their conviction, saying:
[N]o man is permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the outcome.
That interest cannot be defined with precision. Circumstances and relationships
must be considered.
Id. at 136. Despite this binding definition of interest, most district and circuit courts still
defined interest in the traditional manner. See Senate Hearings on S. 1064, supra note
16, at 101.
101. THE APPEARANCE OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 99-101.
102. In re Eatonton Elec. Co., 120 F. 1010, 1012 (S.D. Ga. 1903); In re Fox West Coast
Theaters, 25 F. Supp. 250 (S.D. Cal. 1933), aff'd, 88 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1937).
103. Senate Hearings on S. 1064, supra note 16, at 104.
104. REPORTER'S NOTES, supra note 2, at 67.
105. Senate Hearings on S. 1064, supra note 16, at 104. At the hearing, Wayne Thode
also noted that "[t]he relationship disqualification standard applies in the same manner
to a judge's relatives, to a judge's spouse's relatives, and to the spouses of all the foregoing
relatives." Id. at 96.
106. 28 U.S.C.A. § 455(b)(5) (Supp. Feb. 1975). See Appendix I, infra.
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judicial recusal necessary when any person "within the third degree of
relationship"'' 7 to the judge or his spouse is a party or an officer, director
or trustee to the party in the proceeding; is a lawyer or, to the judge's
knowledge, likely to be a material witness in the proceeding; or is known
by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by
the outcome of the proceeding.' Thus, the new subsection deals with
relationships which the prior statute termed as "so related to or con-
nected with any party of his attorney as to render it improper, [for the
judge] to sit. . ...""
Although the statute mandates recusal where "near relatives" are
involved, the Senate hearings suggest that the judge need not automati-
cally disqualify himself merely because a near relative is affiliated with
a firm involved in litigation before him." The committee felt that such
"broad disqualification is not justified.""' It did indicate, however, that
a judge should recuse himself where the "lawyer-relative's interest in the
law firm could be substantially affected" by the judge's decision." 2 De-
spite the fact that this new subsection does not totally clarify the mean-
ing of substantial interest, it might prevent problems that arose under
the old statute."3 For example, under the new subsection, if the trustee
107. In Senate Hearings on S. 1064, supra note 16, at 98, the committee reprinted a
chart which listed the degrees of relationship. At that hearing, Wayne Thode noted:
[T]he method of determining the degree of relationship between a judge and a
person whose relationship with the judge may disqualify the judge ... [is] to
count ... from the judge to the common ancestor and from the common ances-
tor to the person whose relationship raises the issue. For example, if the issue is
raised by the judge's relationship with X, a son of the judge's father's brother,
the counting of degrees would be as follows:
The judge's father is related in the first degree; his father's father, the com-
mon ancestor, in the second degree; the father's brother, in the third degree; and
the brother's son, X, is related to the judge in the fourth degree.
Id. at 96. The REPORTER'S NOTES, supra note 2, at 16, states that "the third degree of
relationship test would, for example, disqualify the judge if his or his spouse's father,
grandfather, uncle, brother or niece's husband were a party or lawyer in the proceeding,
but would not disqualify him if a cousin were a party or lawyer in the proceeding."
108. 28 U.S.C.A. § 455(b)(5) (Supp. Feb. 1975). See Appendix I, infra.
109. Ch. 646 § 455, 62 Stat. 908 (1948) as amended 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1970).
110. Senate Hearings on S. 1064, supra note 16, at 96.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See In re Four Seasons Sec. Law Litigation, 328 F. Supp. 221 (Judicial Panel of
Multi-district Litigation 1971), where Judge Bohannon appointed Edward Barth as co-
counsel to the trustee. At that time, Barth was a partner in a firm in which Judge
Bohannon's son was also a partner. In this case, Judge Bohannon did not recuse himself
but Barth did resign. See also THE APPEARANCE OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 104-08, which
details the irregularities of these arrangements. See also Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble
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in bankruptcy of a litigant was a member of a firm in which the judge's
son was a partner, this would constitute a substantial interest mandat-
ing judicial disqualification; whereas under the narrower "near relative"
standard of the prior statute, there was no mandate for disqualification
in the same situation and only a judge who was very sensitive about the
spirit of the law would recuse himself.
Besides clarifying the terms interest and relations, the new statute
demands a kind of self-knowledge and awareness on the part of the judge
that was absent from the old section 455.114 Previously, the judge did not
have to know about his financial holdings."5 Under the new statute's
subsection (c), the judge has a duty to "inform himself about his per-
sonaloand fiduciary financial interests and make a reasonable effort to
inform himself about the financial interests of his spouse and minor
children . . . in his household."I" Although this duty is voluntary rather
than mandatory, discussion at the Senate hearings indicates that the
judge who fails to keep currently informed about his financial and fidu-
ciary relationships "should be subject to sanctions for violation of that
provision.'""'
Although subsection (c) seeks to establish an affirmative duty to
make oneself aware of one's own assets,"' the judge need only make a
Oil & Refining Co., 403 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1968) for an example of what John P. Frank
and others have called the "velvet blackjack." Here, the judges' wives had financial
holdings in one of the litigant companies and one judge leased property to it. Although
the judges concluded that they were not disqualified for "interest" under the former § 455
(1970), they nonetheless recused themselves. This case illustrates just one of the many
problems resulting from the old statute's vagueness. As MacKenzie says in THE APPEAR-
ANCE OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 97:
Essentially, the Velvet Blackjack is a game based on assumed relationships of
mutual confidence; it is, in other words, a species of confidence game . . . the
victim must decide not only whether to repose his trust in the individual, but
more humanly wrenching, he must weigh the consequences of betraying appar-
ent distrust and the risks of offending the other party. When the other party is
a black-robed judge and the decision falls upon the lawyer, there is an extra
dimension of human difficulty: the technical vulnerability of the judge.
114. This description applies to the Code of Judicial Conduct as well as to the new
statute. See Senate Hearings on S. 1064, supra note 16, at 104-05. See also House Hearings
on S. 1064, supra note 70, at 7.
115. Ch. 646 §455, 62 Stat. 908 (1948) as amended 28 U.S.C.A. §455 (Supp. Feb. 1975).
116. 28 U.S.C.A. §455(c) (Supp. Feb. 1975) is identical to Canon 3C(2) of the ABA
CODE, supra note 4. See Appendix I, infra.
117. Senate Hearings on S. 1064, supra note 16, at 104. See REPORTER'S NOTES, supra
note 2, at 68, for similar comments made by the ABA committee. Neither the ABA nor
the Senate committee ventured to say what those sanctions should be and who should
enforce them. See also the discussion regarding enforcement of the Statute and the Code,
notes 167-84 and accompanying text, infra.
118. In Kinnear-Weed Co. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 403 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1968),
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"reasonable effort" to ascertain the personal financial interest of his
spouse and minor children. The drafters of the statute wanted to distin-
guish a judge's knowledge of his own finances from those of his children
and spouse because they felt that a judge should "not be forced to
demand and obtain information about the affairs of his spouse and
minor children residing in his household""' 9 in order to preserve the
appearance of impartiality. 20 Therefore, only a reasonable effort to learn
about their finances is necessary.' Moreover, the judge's reasonable
efforts are directed toward only -the personal finances of his spouse and
minor children; he does not have to make any effort to determine the
nature of their business interests, nor examine any interests of the adult
members of his family who might reside in his household. 22 However,
the Senate's hypothetical reasonable man probably would have found
highly suspicious the fact that a judge could remain ignorant of the
personal finances of those who reside with him.'23 But the Senate sub-
committee's reasons for sanctioning such ignorance did not address this
incongruity; it felt that a judge does not have any influence or control
over his adult offspring, nor would they have any influence over the
judge.2 4 This vision, however, does not comport with reality; adult chil-
drens' behavior can have an influence over their parents, even if one
parent is a judge."5 Consequently, a judge's dubious ignorance of his
the judges claimed to be unaware of their rather substantial interests in the parties before
them. Judge Haynsworth also was unaware of his Brunswick stock holdings until the
decision in that case was in final form. Brunswick Corp. v. Long, 392 F.2d 337 (4th Cir.
1968).
119. Senate Hearings on S. 1064, supra note 16, at 104-05. See also REPORTER'S NOTES,
supra note 2, at 68.
120. Senate Hearings on S. 1064, supra note 16, at 104. See also REPORTER'S NOTES,
supra note 2, at 68.
121. S. REP. No. 93-419, supra note 6, at 6.
122. Senate Hearings on S. 1064, supra note 16, at 104. See also REPORTER'S NOTES,
supra note 2, at 68.
123. Senate Hearings on S. 1064, supra note 16, at 76, 93. The REPORTER'S NOTES, supra
note 2, at 60, indicate that this standard for judicial disqualification is "[alny conduct
that would lead a reasonable man knowing all the circumstances to the conclusion that
the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned .. " In light of this standard,
the Code committee seems to take an inconsistent stance in regard to the judge's environ-
ment.
124. Senate Hearings on S. 1064, supra note 16, at 101. See also REPORTER'S NOTES,
supra note 2, at 67-68.
125. See, e.g., Estate of McDonald, 128 Cal. App. 2d 719, 275 P.2d 917 (1954); In re
Estate of Crawford, 176 Kan. 537, 271 P.2d 240 (1954); Gaver v. Gaver, 176 Md. 171, 4
A.2d 132 (1939); Capozzi v. Capozzi, 1 N.J. 523, 64 A.2d 433 (1949), for a recognition of
children's undue influence over parents, especially where a relationship of trust and con-
fidence exists. See also 10 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 233 (D.
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family's finances would certainly amount to an appearance of
impropriety.
While the Senate's distinction between personal and other financial
interests does not seem justified, 2 ' the committee did list criteria by
which the reasonableness of the judge's efforts to learn of such interest
can be measured. This list looks to the origin and nature of the spouse's
or minor child's interest, and the judge's prior supervision of it."7 How-
ever, the criteria do not determine the reasonableness of the judge's
ignorance of the others within his household, although these other inter-
ests are often both substantial and influential' and should require dis-
qualification of the judge.
D. Waiver of Disqualification
Similar to the stipulation by attorneys regarding evidentiary rules'
and findings of fact,23 the otherwise mandated disqualification of a
judge under the new section 455 may be stipulated by the parties under
Sills ed. 1968), where the author indicates that middle class parents are more permissive
toward their children's expressed needs and wishes.
126. This action also seems to be inconsistent with Canon 2 of the ABA CODE, supra
note 4, which states: "A judge should not allow his family, social, or other relationships
to influence his judicial conduct or judgement. .. ."
127. The REPORTER'S NOTES, supra note 4, at 68, establish the following criteria to
determine whether a judge has made "reasonable efforts" to learn of the financial interests
of his spouse and minor children:
Did the interest of the spouse or child come from the judge or from another
source? Does the spouse or child know the nature of the interest, or is he or she
the beneficiary of a blind trust? Has the spouse's or child's financial interest
been supervised by the judge in the past, or has the judge not been involved in
the handling of the interest?
It is important to note, however, that the new statute does not explicitly adopt these
criteria, although they were mentioned at the hearings. See Senate Hearings on S. 1064,
supra note 16, at 101-02.
128. See note 113, supra. Although it is possible that Judge Bohannon's son had no
influence over his father, the reasonable man would have viewed this situation with
suspicion. The judge violated the appearance of justice standard. THE APPEARANCE OF
JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 104.
129. It is generally within the power of attorneys to stipulate as to matters of evidence.
See Kneeland v. Luce, 141 U.S. 437 (1891); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Harris, 97 U.S. 331
(1877). When parties stipulate to such matters, they are in fact waiving their right to a
court determination.
130. See, e.g., Clason v. Matko, 223 U.S. 646 (1912) and H. Hackfeld & Co. v. United
States, 197 U.S. 442 (1904), which show how litigants and their attorneys may stipulate
as to certain facts in a case which in essence amounts to a waiver of their right to contest
the facts.
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subsection (e).' However, unlike other kinds of stipulation, waiver of
judicial disqualification may be more often the result of the trial judge's
subtle coercion.'32 Thus, waiver of disqualification may appease the
judge at the expense of injury to one or both of the parties.
The waiver language of amended section 455 diverges substantially
from that of the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct.'3 These divergences
hardly improve the flaws of the Code and, in some respects, even aggra-
vate its weaknesses. Consequently, a detailed comparison of these pas-
sages "I4 will reveal that the net effect of this alteration may negate the
balance of the statute's requirements for disqualification.
Although the prior statute'35 did not expressly provide for waiver,
most federal courts did allow any disqualification of judges to be waived
by the parties.'36 Under the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct, certain
causes for disqualification may not be waived. According to the Code,
while a party may not waive the appearance of justice standard, nor
bias, prejudice or prior knowledge, he may waive disqualification for the
judge's personal relationships or financial interests. 37 In addition, the
Code states that this waiver also applies to relatives of the judge's
spouse. 38 Such a waiver may be made only if the judge discloses his
131. 28 U.S.C.A. §455(e) (Supp. Feb. 1975). See Appendix I, infra.
132. See note 113, supra, which discusses the "velvet blackjack."
133. Compare 28 U.S.C.A. §455(e) (Supp. Feb. 1975) (See Appendix I, infra), with
Canon 3D, ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1972) wich provides that a judge who is
disqualified for family financial interests, Canon 3C(1)(c), or for the "near relative"
standard Canon 3C(1)(d)
may instead of withdrawing from the proceeding, disclose on the record the basis
of his disqualification. If, based on such disclosure, the parties and lawyers,
independently of the judge's participation, all agree in writing that the judge's
relationship is immaterial or that his financial interest is insubstantial, the
judge is no longer disqualified, and may participate in the proceeding. The
agreement, signed by all parties and lawyers, shall be incorporated in the record
of the proceeding.
134. See id.
135. Ch. 646 §455, 62 Stat. 908 (1948) as amended 28 U.S.C.A. §455 (Supp. Feb. 1975).
136. See Adams v. United States, 302 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1962) (a substantial interest
of a judge may be waived); Ramirez v. United States, 294 F.2d 277 (9th Cir. 1961) (where
defendant had not made a timely objection, he had waived his right to protest interest);
Coltrane v. Templeton, 106 F. 370 (4th Cir. 1901) (where all the facts are known, a waiver
was valid even though the judge had a substantial interest). But see United States v.
Amerine, 411 F.2d 1130 (6th Cir. 1969) (where a waiver of disqualification was disallowed
because the court claimed that the statute was mandatory); In re Eatonton Elec. Co., 120
F. 1010 (D.C.Ga. 1903) (although a disqualification based upon relationship could be
waived, it should not be).
137. See ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, (1972), Canon 3D, supra note 133.
138. REPORTER'S NOTES, supra note 2, at 60. The question remains whether the waiver
should not also apply to the judge's business acquaintances and friends. While a judge
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possible disqualification on the record, and the parties and their attor-
neys, "independently of the judge's participation, all agree in writing
that the judge's relationship is immaterial or that his financial interest
is insubstantial."'39 After such agreement is signed by all the parties and
their attorneys, it is added to the court record. Then the judge is no
longer disqualified and the proceeding may continue.
Under the Code, the waiver provision cannot be used at all if the judge
is not willing to proceed.'40 However, if the judge is willing to participate,
he indicates his willingness by disclosing on the record the basis of his
disqualification.'' According to the Code, the judge need not show how
he reached his decision; he merely has to show that he made it. For
example, he has only to declare that his stock interest in the proceeding
is insubstantial without having to disclose the number of shares he holds
in that company.'
Since the "judge is neither required to nor expected to file a full
accounting of his financial assets to aid the parties and attorneys in
making their decision, 1' it is difficult for the parties to make a rational
decision. Further, the lack of a full disclosure record will provide little
guidance for other judges on the question of recusal. In addition, since
it is the judge himself who determines the insubstantiality of his finan-
cial interest or impartiality, the parties and their attorneys, without
records, will never be able to make a knowing waiver.
Moreover, the fact that the Code permits the judge to rule on these
matters himself, interjects the very subjectivity which the Code, by
formulating the objective "appearance of justice" standard, sought to
avoid.' By allowing the judge to rule on his own impartiality, this
provision violates one of the fundamental tenets of our law: that "no
man is permitted to try cases as a judge where he has an interest in the
outcome."'' 5 Surely, a judge has an interest in the outcome of a proceed-
may be able to divorce his personal relationships from his judicial decisions, the litigant
who must face the judge's friends in court may not believe that the judge can decide fairly.
Perhaps the solution here is to mandate recusal whenever such a situation occurs.
139. ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1972), Canon 3D, supra note 133. The ABA
committee's comments to Canon 3D indicate that hardship to litigants who would not be
able to substitute judges was a major consideration in the creation of this waiver provision.
See REPORTER'S NOTES, supra note 2, at 71.
140. REPORTER'S NOTES, supra note 2, at 71.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955); Ofutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11
(1954); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927). See also Dr. Bonham's Case. 77 Eng. Rep.
646 (K.B. 1609).
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ing in which his impartiality is questioned. 4 '
The ABA Code's waiver provision is expressly designed "to protect the
judge from a claim of judicial misconduct"'47 rather than to aid the
parties or "guarantee the validity of the decision.""'4 However, it is
difficult to see how this provision, which allows the judge to rule on
disqualification, will avoid judicial misconduct. Furthermore, even if
the judge is not an intimate participant of the decision to waive or not
to waive disqualification, the old "velvet blackjack"'49 will still be
swung, especially if the lawyer appears often before the same judge.
Subsection (e) encounters some of the same problems as does its ABA
counterpart along with creating new ones. While the ABA Code permits
the parties to waive the judge's disqualification for his and his immedi-
ate family's financial interests and his near relationships, the federal
statute mandates disqualification for those same interests, as well as for
prior knowledge and former employment.'50 On the other hand, subsec-
tion (e) allows a judge to accept a waiver in the most critical situation
of all-where the appearance of impartiality might be reasonably ques-
tioned by the reasonable man.' 5'
The federal provision for the waiver of the appearance of impartiality
states that "waiver may be accepted [when] it is preceded by a full
disclosure on the record of the basis for disqualification."' 52 Though this
provision is silent as to procedure, the waiver procedure will probably
be the same as that in the Code of Judicial Conduct.' 3 First, the judge
will disclose the basis of his disqualification for apparent partiality and
then the parties and attorneys will decide whether or not to waive.
146. Neither the statute nor the Code makes clear how the judge's disqualification
comes about. As under 28 U.S.C. §144 (1970), see note 8 and accompanying text supra,
the party will probably make a motion to have the judge recuse himself. However, it is
also possible that under both the Code and the statute, the mandatory language requires
that the judge recuse himself without motions by any of the parties.
147. RePoRTEa'S NOTES, supra note 2, at 72.
148. Id. at 73.
149. John Frank, in Senate Hearings on S. 1064, supra note 16, at 115, described the
use of this weapon: "The practicalities of life are that waiver can be a kind of velvet
blackjack in which the lawyer who is going to appear before the same judge at another
time really has very little choice" (emphasis added). See also note 113, supra.
150. 28 U.S.C.A. §455(e) (Supp. Feb. 1975). See also, S. REP. No. 93-419, supra note 6.
151. 28 U.S.C.A. §455(e) (Supp. Feb. 1975). See Appendix I, infra.
152. Id. The ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1972), however, does not require full
disclosure.
153. This assumption is reasonable in light of the fact that §455 was based on the ABA
Code. Moreover, the Judicial Conference has adopted the Code. See note 7, supra. See
also H.R. REP. No. 93-1453, supra note 33, at 11, where the committee report suggests that
such procedure be followed.
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Obviously, the reasons for the appearances of the "velvet blackjack"'5
parallel those in the Code of Judicial Conduct. Further, because the
federal statute does not specify the proceeding through which the waiver
is executed, it is possible that disqualification may be waived by the
attorneys without the knowledge or approval of the litigants.'5 If this is
the case, the likelihood of judicial pressure upon an attorney to waive
disqualification will be even stronger.'56 Moreover, the fact that the
appearance of justice standard of subsection (a) is waivable makes this
new statute susceptible to the critical weakness of the old; that it too
lacks a central, coherent guideline for federal judges to follow.
A major difference between the federal statute and the Code of Judi-
cial Conduct is one of language. The Code of Judicial Conduct states
that: "A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited
to instances where [list of situations follows] . ". . ."I" On the other
hand, the federal statute declares that a judge "shall also disqualify
himself in the following circumstances . . . ,,151 While this terminologi-
cal difference might at first seem trivial, in reality this variance is cru-
cial. By specifically indicating that the list of disqualifying instances is
not exclusive, the Code of Judicial Conduct emphasizes that its provi-
sions cannot-and are not meant to be-the only standards for judicial
disqualification. The Code seems to demand that the judge look beyond
the four comers of a list which cannot exhaust all the situations he
might encounter in determining his ultimate impartiality. In contrast
to the Code, section 455's language indicates that its provisons are ex-
haustive. A judge need not look beyond the statute-and the waivable
appearance of propriety standard-to determine his own qualifications.
The guidelines for judicial disqualification under the federal statute are
therefore seriously limited in their ability to accomodate future, unfore-
seen biases and conflicts of interest that may face the judiciary.
E. Unresolved Problems
The promulgation of the new federal statute for judicial disqualifica-
154. See note 113, supra.
155. REPORTER'S NOTES, supra note 2, at 73, indicated that the signatures of the litigants
should be required to "reduce the likelihood that a waiver agreement will be entered into
because of judicial pressure." The Senate hearings are silent about whether this procedure
is to be used under the statute. However, the Code's method of waiver is mentioned at
the Senate Hearings on S. 1064, supra note 16, at 115.
156. REPORTER'S NOTES, supra note 2, at 73.
157. ABA CODE, supra note 4, Canon 3C (emphasis added).
158. 28 U.S.C.A. §455(b) (Supp. Feb. 1975) (emphasis added). See Appendix I, infra.
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tion marks the creation of higher and firmer public expectations of
judicial ethics.'59 The statute,' patterned after the Code of Judicial
Conduct,' espouses the "appearance of justice" as the general guideline
for judicial disqualification and then enumerates various involvements
that mandate the judge's recusal. The enunciation of specific areas of
mandatory disqualification is a great improvement over the vague older
statute and judicial canons. However, the far-reaching "appearance of
justice" standard does not obliterate the use of the "velvet blackjack"
and is not broad enough to cover unforeseen problems. An example of
this inadequacy, mentioned earlier,' is the fact that neither the Code
of Judicial Conduct nor the new statute makes any explicit provision for
possible bias with respect to an issue. 3 While the Code's list of disquali-
fying instances and nonwaivable "appearance of justice" standard
might be able to reach this kind of bias, the statute, whose list will be
construed as exhaustive, will not necessarily mandate disqualification
in cases where a judge's issue-bias is established by his pre-elevation
activities and writings. Further, the statute's general standard is waiva-
ble and thus might not afford relief to the unwary litigant.
In addition, though the statute enunciates the appearance of impro-
priety as a general standard for judicial recusal, it does not explain its
meaning. The legislative history of the statute suggests that this stan-
dard is determined by reference to the reasonable man,"4 but nowhere
does the legislative history indicate how the reasonable man judges
impropriety or the appearance thereof. Since the statute's ethical provi-
sion has not provided any factual or concrete examples of the "appear-
ance of impropriety," perhaps all that the standard really accomplishes
is to make a judge "the victim of the appearane of impropriety
. . ,1'165 The fact that the judge rules on his own propriety makes the
general standard even more difficult to define.
The enforceability of the "appearance of justice" standard is another
problem facing the new statute and the Code. In the case of the Code
of Judicial Conduct, the standard cannot be enforced unless all jurisdic-
tions adopt the Code and "establish effective disciplinary procedures for
159. See, e.g., Senate Hearings on S. 1064, supra note 16.
160. 28 U.S.C.A. §455 (Supp. Feb. 1975). See Appendix I, infra.
161. See notes 133 and 58. ABA CODE, supra note 9.
162. See discussion in text accompanying notes 43-56, supra.
163. See discussion in text accompanying notes 34-41, supra.
164. Senate Hearings on S. 1064, supra note 16, at 95. See also REPORTER'S NOTES, supra
note 2, at 60.
165. J. C. GOULDEN, THE BENCHWARMERS 294 (1974) [hereinafter, cited as THE
BENCHWARMERS].
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its enforcement.""' Thus, the individual states"7 have the ultimate re-
sponsibility for adoption and enforcement of the Code of Judicial Con-
duct. The states, through statutory and constitutional provisions, can
regulate judicial conduct of state judges in a manner which would be
impossible under the protections given to federal judges."'
While the several states can establish commissions and internal judi-
cial sanctions against wayward judges,'69 it is far from certain that any
particular body, other than Congress via the impeachment powers, has
the power to regulate the conduct of federal judges. 76 Therefore, even
though the Judicial Conference of the United States has adopted the
new Code,'7' the ability of that body to enforce the ABA standard is in
doubt.7 ' While the Act establishing the Judicial Conference 7" is not a
model of clarity,7 4 recent statutory attempts to clarify its enforcement
166. Preface to the ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1972).
167. Id. See R. J. Martineau, Enforcement of Judicial Conduct, 1972 UTAH L. REV. 410
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Enforcement of Judicial Conduct].
168. Id. at 416. Martineau points out that while there are a number of state agencies-
the legislature, the supreme court, the discipline committee and the governor-which
can regulate state judges, the Supreme Court of the United States has not exercised
any of its authority over federal judges. "In the federal system neither the circuit judicial
council nor the Judicial Conference is a court and thus probably lacks the contempt
power" over judges. Id. at 417. See also Hearings on the Independence of Federal Judges
Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 932 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Judicial Independence),
where one commentator states that the independence of federal judges "means that
judges do their duty as they see it without accounting to any higher power [save] the
Congress, and then only to the extent provided by Article II, Section 4, and Article I,
Sections 2 and 3 .. "
169. Hearings on Judicial Independence, supra note 168, at 932.
170. Congress can impeach federal judges for high crimes and misdemeanors, art. II,
§4, or for lack of good behavior, art. III, §1. But no one is certain of the meaning of "good
behavior." See THE BENCHWARMERS, supra note 165, at 292. See also R. CRAMER & J.
BARRON, THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REMOVAL AND MANDATORY REQUIREMENT PROCEDURES
FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, SELECTED READINGS IN JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL (1973).
171. See notes 5 and 6, supra.
172. Enforcement of Judicial Conduct, supra note 167, at 416-17.
173. 28 U.S.C. §331 (1970) sets up the Judicial Conference of the United States which
is composed of the chief judge of each circuit, the chief judge of the Court of Claims, the
chief judge of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, and a district judge from each
circuit. 28 U.S.C. §332 (1971) creates the Judicial Council for each circuit. "Each judicial
council shall make all necessary orders for the effective and expeditious administration
of the business of the courts within its circuit." The council must write reports for the
administrative office of the courts. 28 U.S.C. §333 (1970) is the enabling act for the judicial
conferences of the circuits. Its functions are not clearly distinguished from those of the
judicial council because §333 also provides for meetings to consider "means of improving
the administration of justice with [each] circuit." See note 5, supra.
174. Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 85 n.6 (1970).
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power have been thwarted'73 under the strong influence of the federal
judiciary. The Supreme Court indicated in dicta in a 1970 case'75 that
the judicial conference of a circuit can instigate and enforce certain
disciplinary actions against a district court judge, but it refused to rule
on that issue and declared the case was non-justiciable."' Thus, neither
Congress nor the Supreme Court has authorized the Judicial Conference
to regulate the ethics of the federal bench.
Another problem in regulating the federal, as opposed to the state,
judiciary is a more entrenched tradition of separation of powers'7 and
an independent judiciary on the national level.'79 In addition, the
"greater legislative involvement in the administration of justice that
exists under the Federal Constitution as opposed to the state constitu-
tions"' 0 makes federal enforcement of any regulation difficult.' One
recent observer has pungently noted that "no force on earth can compel
a judge to work . . ."I" if he chooses not to do so. As this essay has
demonstrated, "the federal judiciary is . . .particularly exempt from
outside scrutiny."'' 3
CONCLUSION
The narrower coverage of the new federal statute magnifies the prob-
lem of enforcing the Code of Judicial Conduct against the federal judici-
ary. Under the statute, an unwary litigant may waive the appearance
of justice standard, and once the judge rules on the case, not even an
appeal can correct deficiencies in the appearance of justice. A court of
appeals can only overrule, not regulate. 84 However, were there a body
175. Senate Bill 1506 would have created a "Commission on Judicial Disabilities and
Tenure" which would have had the power to investigate, upon complaint, whether the
conduct of a judge had been consistent with the good behavior required by art. III of the
Constitution. See Hearings on S. 1506, 1507, 1508, 1509, 1510 et al. Before the Subcomm.
on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st
Cong., 1st & 2nd Sess. 48-49 (Nov. 1969-Apr. 1970).
176. Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74 (1970).
177. Id. at 84-89.
178. Id. at 136 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
179. Enforcement of Judicial Conduct, supra note 167, at 416.
180. Id.
181. See the letter appendixed to Hearings on Judicial Machinery, supra note 72, at
33, for a judicial denunciation of any regulation of judicial behavior.
182. THE BENCHWARMERS, supra note 165, at 6.
183. Id. at 15.
184. 28 U.S.C. §1291 (1970) provides for appellate court review of final decisions of
district courts. This power of review does not, however, allow the court of appeals to
censure the district court judge.
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that could enforce a code of ethics, the unethical judge could be disci-
plined, and enforcement of the ethical standard would for the first time
occur.
Although the new Code and statute provide more explicit standards
for judicial disqualification, they are not explicit enough to accomodate
future challenges to judicial impartiality. Moreover, the unenforcea-
bility of "above reproach" judicial conduct dampens the gunpowder of
the Code and statute. Until the federal judiciary and Congress work
together within the confines of the Constitution to provide a body to
administer an ethical standard, the ammunition provided by the Code
of Judicial Conduct and the judicial disqualifications statute will fall
short of the target of an even-handed federal judiciary.
Sharon Turkish Jacobson
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APPENDIX I
28 U.S.C.A. § 455 (Supp. Feb. 1975) provides:
(a) Any justice, judge, magistrate, or referee in bankruptcy of the
United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which this
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:
(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a
party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts con-
cerning the proceeding;
(2) Where in private practice he served as lawyer in the
matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously
practiced law served during such association as a lawyer con-
cerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a mate-
rial witness concerning it;
(3) Where he has served in governmental employment and
in such capacity participated as counsel, adviser or material
witness concerning the proceeding or expressed an opinion con-
cerning the merits of the particular case in controversy;
(4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his
spouse or minor child residing in his household, has a financial
interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the
proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially
affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of
relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person:
(i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, direc-
tor, or trustee of a party;
(ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that
could be substantially affected by the outcome of the
proceeding;
(iv) Is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a mate-
rial witness in the proceeding.
(c) A judge should inform himself about his personal and fiduciary
financial interests, and make a reasonable effort to inform himself about
the personal financial interests of his spouse and minor children residing
in his household.
(d) For the purposes of this section the following words or phrases
shall have the meaning indicated:
(1) "proceeding" includes pretrial, trial, appellate review, or
other stages of litigation;
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(2) the degree of relationship is calculated according to the
civil law system;
(3) "fiduciary" includes such relationships as executor,
administrator, trustee, and guardian;
(4) "financial interest" means ownership of a legal or equi-
table interest, however small, or a relationship as director, ad-
viser, or other active participant in the affairs of a party, except
that:
(i) Ownership in a mutual or common investment
fund that holds securities is not a "financial interest" in
such securities unless the judge participates in the man-
agement of the fund;
(ii) An office in an educational, religious, charitable,
fraternal, or civic organization is not a "financial inter-
est" in securities held by the organization;
(iii) The proprietary interest of a policyholder in a
mutual insurance company, of a depositor in a mutual
savings association, or a similar proprietary interest, is
a "financial interest" in the organization only if the out-
come of the proceeding could substantially affect the
value of the interest;
(iv) Ownership of government securities is a "finan-
cial interest" in the issuer only if the outcome of the
proceeding could substantially affect the value of the
securities.
(e) No justice, judge, magistrate, or referee in bankruptcy shall ac-
cept from the parties to the proceeding a waiver of any ground for
disqualification enumerated in subsection (b). Where the ground for
disqualification arises only under subsection (a), waiver may be ac-
cepted provided it is preceded by a full disclosure on the record of the
basis for disqualification.
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